The monotonous cycle of Bamar political leaders and Bamar military leaders taking turns in the spotlight on Myanmar’s political stage has seen a shift in the storyline in 2024. While the directors of this play may not have changed much, what good we can extract from this mess depends on the true beliefs of the characters about Myanmar and how far-sighted they are in the long run.
Looking back at the beginning of the story, when Myanmar was about to gain independence, the Bamar AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) leaders persuaded the other ethnic groups to form a union. There is no record of any ethnic groups initiating or persuading the Bamar leaders to unite. After that, as everyone knows, in the 1947 Constitution, Rakhine, Mon, and Chin were not given states, and even the Karen were given the Kawthoolei designation. Instead of a Bamar state, the term “Bamar Proper” was used, and Rakhine, Mon, and some of Karen areas were added to it, taking the central government power under the guise of a Union government.
Even the Shan and Kachin, who were given states, had everything from the appointment of the state chief minister to the state budget, to the legislative and administrative powers, handed over to the Bamar prime minister and the Bamar-dominated parliaments. Moreover, the “Bamar Proper” political mainstream became so dominant that in later eras, if anyone wanted to engage in politics, they had to be associated with that mainstream, to go along with the flow.
At that time, the Bamar political leaders’ lack of foresight for the country’s future and their desire to dominate and rule over the ethnic groups led to the start of revolutions from the very beginning of independence, in other words, rebellions, which continue to this day. However, for over 70 years, the Bamar political group and the Bamar military group have taken turns leading Myanmar’s politics, and it could be said that even the rebels have to rebel along that current.
After the Bamar military group was able to decisively defeat the BCP, it can be said that there were not many Bamar rebels to point fingers at. The students who went to the jungle in 1988 chose the border-based strategy, so there were no smell of gun powder in the areas that they themselves forcibly named “Bamar Proper.” Therefore, the situation never deteriorated to the point where it could bring down the Bamar Union government.
In every power struggle between the Bamar military group and the Bamar politicians, the people in the ethnic areas also rose up, and the ethnic armed organizations also supported them, handing over the Union central administrative power to the Bamar political groups. When the Bamar military staged another coup, they made ceasefires and shook hands with the ethnic armed organizations again. In this way, the very revolution dragged on, and the issue of a federal union remained as distant as ever, like a long-lost dream.
When the Bamar military staged another coup in 2021, another mass uprising occurred as usual. But this time, changes began to take place. Other ethnic groups, who are not Bamar, did not take to the streets as much as in previous times. The most obvious example is that the Arakanese people did not do any mass protests on the streets at all. Instead of doing that, they flocked to the Arakan Army, which could determine the fate of Arakan by itself.
Another point is that the ethnic armed groups no longer support the Bamar democratic revolution in the same way as before. To put it bluntly, they no longer join forces to take the power to oppress and rule them from the hands of the Bamar military group and hand it over to the Bamar politicians. Instead of doing that, they have come to focus on regaining their own territories.
At that time, the NLD groups, who were resentful of losing their power, and the Bamar youth who were disgusted by the military coup and wanted democracy, formed the PDFs, which the Bamar military did not expect, and they rebelled in the very Bamar Proper where successive Bamar governments had built prosperity and peace. Not only Bamar youth, but also PDF groups emerged in some ethnic areas. Then came the famous Spring Revolution, named and crowned by the very enthusiastic and talented Myanmar people.
The Spring Revolution was supported by the ethnic revolutionary organizations, and the Spring Revolution also helped create new storylines for the ethnic revolutionary organizations. Revolutionary armies such as Kachin, Karen, and Karenni also joined this storyline. Taking advantage of the crisis of the Bamar military council, which was preoccupied with the Spring Revolution, the Kokang, Ta’ang Palaung, and Arakan, with the 1027 operation, which could be named the Autumn Revolution, aimed to seize and control their own regions. After that, with the 1111 operation and the Kachin (KIA) counter-offensive, the ethnic groups are now focusing all their efforts on completely and thoroughly seizing and controlling their own territories and lands.
Let’s examine the role of the NUG at this time. It can be said that the NUG is led and formed by the NLD, which won the majority in the 2020 election. In other words, because they won in the election legally held under the 2008 Constitution, they are the only legitimate government, having formed a government with the full constitution.
So, let’s look back at the NLD government’s 2015-2020 term, the path of the NUG. It can be said that the NLD government really enjoyed ruling the ethnic areas under the 2008 Constitution, monopolizing and exploiting ethnic resources, and they really liked the taste of being in government. You will all remember many things, such as not allowing the Rakhine and Shan, who won the majority in the ethnic states, to even appoint a state chief minister by the state parliament, and preparing to continue the Chinese projects in Rakhine and signing contracts.
And, following the methods of the previous Bamar politicians, if you look at things like trying to appease the Bamar military to maintain power, telling them to completely crush the Arakan Army, declaring the Arakan Army a terrorist organization, and trying to defend the Bamar military’s crimes up to the ICJ, you will clearly see it.
However, it can be seen that they did not do anything effectively to lay the foundation or initiate practical processes for the emergence of a federal union, which is the main reason for the rebellions in the country. Not to mention laying the foundation for the country, it is not seen that they even made their mother organization, the NLD, institutional for the long term.
Now, the NUG also does not reduce the tone of the winner of the 2020 election, the Myanmar government, as an inheritance of the 2008 Constitution. They even get involved in the Rohingya issue in Arakan. They even chime in on how they will continue the Chinese projects in Arakan. They even want to talk about the Kokang issue. When the military council is recruiting people for military service in the country, causing an uproar, they are not seen to be able to do anything.
It seems that the PDFs have definitively assumed that if they attack and seize central Myanmar, they will hand over power to the NUG. However, Not all PDFs are under the control of the NUG, and most have already rejected the 2008 Constitution, which Min Aung Hlaing has been pointing fingers at all the time and which can be used to stage another coup at any time.
Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that the ethnic revolutionary armies, who are now seizing their own territories, will enthrone the NUG and tell them to come and rule after they have seized everything. According to the interviews and statements of the ERO leaders and the news on the ground during these three years of the coup, it is certain that the current territorial seizures of the EROs, including the 1027 operation, would have happened even if Min Aung Hlaing had not staged the coup and the NLD had formed a government and continued to rule. For example, the Arakan Army, with more than 30,000 to 40,000 armed soldiers gathered under the slogan of regaining Arakan Land to allow Arakanese people to determine its own destiny, will not be easy to maintain for successive NLD governments, and no reason to maintain it can be found.
At that time, what we will inevitably encounter is having to appease the military, and the Bamar people will not be able to understand the ethnic groups in Bamar Proper as they do now, so it will only be ethnic riots created by military-backed organizations like the USDP. Then, again, there will be no peace and stability in the country, and the Myanmar military will have to take control of the country under the father of the nation’s emergency declaration, and they will have to give up the fight.
In this place, the role of the big brother Chinese neighbor cannot be left out. As anyone who understands even the A,B,C,D of politics understands, China is afraid that Myanmar will become a democratic country, a federal union. If that happens, it will develop. It will become close to the West. It will become impossible for them to interfere and influence. So, China makes the military council rely more on them. They weaken the military council by using the EROs close to them. When the EROs join hands with the PDFs and do more than they expected, they give the military council a chance to back them up.
What I mean is, as long as the China supports them, the military council can continue to exist. They will continue to sit firmly in central Myanmar. Even now, it is rumored that the China will allow Min Aung Hlaing to pay a visit to their great capital of China (Correction – He already went to the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Economic Cooperation Meeting on 5th November 2024). Furthermore, it can be said that with the current situation of the PDFs, it is still unlikely to completely defeat the military council in central Myanmar. The big brother, China, has already started to control the northern groups. In 2025, most of the EROs will be able to acquire as much of their territories as they can. The EROs are already forming themselves from revolutionary armies into revolutionary governments and people’s governments.
What I want to say here is, firstly – if the ethnic groups are governing their own territories and the military council is not only continuing to hold on to central Myanmar but also holding elections and pretending to be a legitimate government, and if the neighboring countries, as well as distant countries, who are still dealing with them even after the coup, are all happily saying that the military council-turned-Myanmar government is legitimate, then what will the NUG government actually govern? How much can we rely on the countries that are only focused on giving pocket money and bothering China, and how much do you think we can rely on them?
Secondly – as mentioned earlier, Myanmar’s politics used to be led by the Bamar. The others had to play within their game. In 1947, it was as if the Bamar directly inherited the state power from the British. It was like they had to hold the Panglong Agreement to confirm that and make it legally valid. When they drafted the 2008 Constitution and held elections in 2010, the state power went to Thein Sein’s government. From there, the NLD took over.
Now, in 2021, when the Bamar military staged a coup, they seized state power. While they are seizing power like that, the ethnic EROs are fighting back and reclaiming their own territories. Now they are preparing and starting to move towards their own self-governance.
So, whether you want to form a union, a federal system, or a confederation, you can do it or not. If you want to do it, you must first discuss common definitions that everyone can agree on. In the meantime, neither the military council nor the NUG can come and manage the land that the EROs have captured and governed, land that the ethnic people have owned for generations. They no longer have state power.
Thirdly – according to the situation described above, the military council will try to establish itself in central Myanmar and try to retake as much of the ethnic areas as possible, and to prevent the territories they hold from being lost. The big Chinese will also back that plan. How realistically close is it for the PDFs to completely defeat and seize the areas currently held by the military council? How much can the NUG do in this matter? And how much will the other foreign countries, like China, blatantly interfere?
Therefore, if we look at the situation in Myanmar realistically, some EROs and the military council will be dividing and ruling their respective territories, and the NUG will be in a position where they can only make announcements. They will be like a minister without a portfolio from the AFPFL era. If the NUG’s principle is to recognize the election results under the 2008 Constitution and that state power must be transferred to the NUG, it will probably not be easy to get along with the EROs. The big Chinese will also try to push the NUG out of the Myanmar political game by saying that they are leaning towards the West.
If they say they are going to form a federal union, who is the organization representing central Myanmar or the Bamar people? If the NUG does not completely step down from the stage of a state power-holding organization called the Union government, which Bamar representative will the other ethnic groups have to negotiate with? In that case, the military council may well enter that table with China’s urging. Or, Myanmar can remain in this limbo for quite some time.
Therefore, if you really want peace in Myanmar, and if you want it to be prosperous and developed, whether it is federal or confederation, it can only be achieved if a truly genuine union is formed in which all ethnic groups have equal political rights. Whether it is any group or any ethnicity, if they really sincerely believe in and accept that they don’t want Myanmar to disintegrate, and if they truly believe in democracy, federalism, and equality, and if they can foresee the future, this is a good opportunity given by the Spring Revolution.
The Bamar ethnic people also need to completely abandon the one-nation-one-state mentality at this time, and the other ethnic people also need to be more magnanimous than just wanting their own territory. In fact, it can be said that other ethnic groups who are not Bamar do not really want to control and rule the whole of Myanmar. But because the Bamar tend to monopolize if they unite, they are less trusting because of past lessons.
Finally, the NUG should realistically accept the situation on the ground. They should completely reject and not accept the 2008 Constitution, officially announce their just and workable processes and stances for the Union, start implementing them, and work with other ethnic groups as a representative of the Bamar ethnic people or as a representative of central Myanmar where the majority of Bamar live.
This will also be a counter-attack against China’s attempt to remove the NUG from the practical political arena. If all the ethnic groups unite and negotiate and continue on the path to a genuine union, the military council will automatically be left behind, and it will be more likely that they can be outmaneuvered politically or militarily.
In that case, the militarism, one-nation-one-state ideology, and racism that are currently flourishing in Myanmar can gradually be extinguished, and a new Myanmar with freedom, equality, and justice can emerge. To make that happen, everyone can fight against the military council, which is a major obstacle. Another major obstacle is the desire of one ethnic group or one group to seize state power and the desire to centralize under a unitary system, which must be abandoned, and they must cultivate a vision and magnanimity to truly build a genuine union.
What Will We Gain from the Spring Revolution?
By Sit Nyein Moe Zan
The monotonous cycle of Bamar political leaders and Bamar military leaders taking turns in the spotlight on Myanmar’s political stage has seen a shift in the storyline in 2024. While the directors of this play may not have changed much, what good we can extract from this mess depends on the true beliefs of the characters about Myanmar and how far-sighted they are in the long run.
Looking back at the beginning of the story, when Myanmar was about to gain independence, the Bamar AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) leaders persuaded the other ethnic groups to form a union. There is no record of any ethnic groups initiating or persuading the Bamar leaders to unite. After that, as everyone knows, in the 1947 Constitution, Rakhine, Mon, and Chin were not given states, and even the Karen were given the Kawthoolei designation. Instead of a Bamar state, the term “Bamar Proper” was used, and Rakhine, Mon, and some of Karen areas were added to it, taking the central government power under the guise of a Union government.
Even the Shan and Kachin, who were given states, had everything from the appointment of the state chief minister to the state budget, to the legislative and administrative powers, handed over to the Bamar prime minister and the Bamar-dominated parliaments. Moreover, the “Bamar Proper” political mainstream became so dominant that in later eras, if anyone wanted to engage in politics, they had to be associated with that mainstream, to go along with the flow.
At that time, the Bamar political leaders’ lack of foresight for the country’s future and their desire to dominate and rule over the ethnic groups led to the start of revolutions from the very beginning of independence, in other words, rebellions, which continue to this day. However, for over 70 years, the Bamar political group and the Bamar military group have taken turns leading Myanmar’s politics, and it could be said that even the rebels have to rebel along that current.
After the Bamar military group was able to decisively defeat the BCP, it can be said that there were not many Bamar rebels to point fingers at. The students who went to the jungle in 1988 chose the border-based strategy, so there were no smell of gun powder in the areas that they themselves forcibly named “Bamar Proper.” Therefore, the situation never deteriorated to the point where it could bring down the Bamar Union government.
In every power struggle between the Bamar military group and the Bamar politicians, the people in the ethnic areas also rose up, and the ethnic armed organizations also supported them, handing over the Union central administrative power to the Bamar political groups. When the Bamar military staged another coup, they made ceasefires and shook hands with the ethnic armed organizations again. In this way, the very revolution dragged on, and the issue of a federal union remained as distant as ever, like a long-lost dream.
When the Bamar military staged another coup in 2021, another mass uprising occurred as usual. But this time, changes began to take place. Other ethnic groups, who are not Bamar, did not take to the streets as much as in previous times. The most obvious example is that the Arakanese people did not do any mass protests on the streets at all. Instead of doing that, they flocked to the Arakan Army, which could determine the fate of Arakan by itself.
Another point is that the ethnic armed groups no longer support the Bamar democratic revolution in the same way as before. To put it bluntly, they no longer join forces to take the power to oppress and rule them from the hands of the Bamar military group and hand it over to the Bamar politicians. Instead of doing that, they have come to focus on regaining their own territories.
At that time, the NLD groups, who were resentful of losing their power, and the Bamar youth who were disgusted by the military coup and wanted democracy, formed the PDFs, which the Bamar military did not expect, and they rebelled in the very Bamar Proper where successive Bamar governments had built prosperity and peace. Not only Bamar youth, but also PDF groups emerged in some ethnic areas. Then came the famous Spring Revolution, named and crowned by the very enthusiastic and talented Myanmar people.
The Spring Revolution was supported by the ethnic revolutionary organizations, and the Spring Revolution also helped create new storylines for the ethnic revolutionary organizations. Revolutionary armies such as Kachin, Karen, and Karenni also joined this storyline. Taking advantage of the crisis of the Bamar military council, which was preoccupied with the Spring Revolution, the Kokang, Ta’ang Palaung, and Arakan, with the 1027 operation, which could be named the Autumn Revolution, aimed to seize and control their own regions. After that, with the 1111 operation and the Kachin (KIA) counter-offensive, the ethnic groups are now focusing all their efforts on completely and thoroughly seizing and controlling their own territories and lands.
Let’s examine the role of the NUG at this time. It can be said that the NUG is led and formed by the NLD, which won the majority in the 2020 election. In other words, because they won in the election legally held under the 2008 Constitution, they are the only legitimate government, having formed a government with the full constitution.
So, let’s look back at the NLD government’s 2015-2020 term, the path of the NUG. It can be said that the NLD government really enjoyed ruling the ethnic areas under the 2008 Constitution, monopolizing and exploiting ethnic resources, and they really liked the taste of being in government. You will all remember many things, such as not allowing the Rakhine and Shan, who won the majority in the ethnic states, to even appoint a state chief minister by the state parliament, and preparing to continue the Chinese projects in Rakhine and signing contracts.
And, following the methods of the previous Bamar politicians, if you look at things like trying to appease the Bamar military to maintain power, telling them to completely crush the Arakan Army, declaring the Arakan Army a terrorist organization, and trying to defend the Bamar military’s crimes up to the ICJ, you will clearly see it.
However, it can be seen that they did not do anything effectively to lay the foundation or initiate practical processes for the emergence of a federal union, which is the main reason for the rebellions in the country. Not to mention laying the foundation for the country, it is not seen that they even made their mother organization, the NLD, institutional for the long term.
Now, the NUG also does not reduce the tone of the winner of the 2020 election, the Myanmar government, as an inheritance of the 2008 Constitution. They even get involved in the Rohingya issue in Arakan. They even chime in on how they will continue the Chinese projects in Arakan. They even want to talk about the Kokang issue. When the military council is recruiting people for military service in the country, causing an uproar, they are not seen to be able to do anything.
It seems that the PDFs have definitively assumed that if they attack and seize central Myanmar, they will hand over power to the NUG. However, Not all PDFs are under the control of the NUG, and most have already rejected the 2008 Constitution, which Min Aung Hlaing has been pointing fingers at all the time and which can be used to stage another coup at any time.
Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that the ethnic revolutionary armies, who are now seizing their own territories, will enthrone the NUG and tell them to come and rule after they have seized everything. According to the interviews and statements of the ERO leaders and the news on the ground during these three years of the coup, it is certain that the current territorial seizures of the EROs, including the 1027 operation, would have happened even if Min Aung Hlaing had not staged the coup and the NLD had formed a government and continued to rule. For example, the Arakan Army, with more than 30,000 to 40,000 armed soldiers gathered under the slogan of regaining Arakan Land to allow Arakanese people to determine its own destiny, will not be easy to maintain for successive NLD governments, and no reason to maintain it can be found.
At that time, what we will inevitably encounter is having to appease the military, and the Bamar people will not be able to understand the ethnic groups in Bamar Proper as they do now, so it will only be ethnic riots created by military-backed organizations like the USDP. Then, again, there will be no peace and stability in the country, and the Myanmar military will have to take control of the country under the father of the nation’s emergency declaration, and they will have to give up the fight.
In this place, the role of the big brother Chinese neighbor cannot be left out. As anyone who understands even the A,B,C,D of politics understands, China is afraid that Myanmar will become a democratic country, a federal union. If that happens, it will develop. It will become close to the West. It will become impossible for them to interfere and influence. So, China makes the military council rely more on them. They weaken the military council by using the EROs close to them. When the EROs join hands with the PDFs and do more than they expected, they give the military council a chance to back them up.
What I mean is, as long as the China supports them, the military council can continue to exist. They will continue to sit firmly in central Myanmar. Even now, it is rumored that the China will allow Min Aung Hlaing to pay a visit to their great capital of China (Correction – He already went to the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation Economic Cooperation Meeting on 5th November 2024). Furthermore, it can be said that with the current situation of the PDFs, it is still unlikely to completely defeat the military council in central Myanmar. The big brother, China, has already started to control the northern groups. In 2025, most of the EROs will be able to acquire as much of their territories as they can. The EROs are already forming themselves from revolutionary armies into revolutionary governments and people’s governments.
What I want to say here is, firstly – if the ethnic groups are governing their own territories and the military council is not only continuing to hold on to central Myanmar but also holding elections and pretending to be a legitimate government, and if the neighboring countries, as well as distant countries, who are still dealing with them even after the coup, are all happily saying that the military council-turned-Myanmar government is legitimate, then what will the NUG government actually govern? How much can we rely on the countries that are only focused on giving pocket money and bothering China, and how much do you think we can rely on them?
Secondly – as mentioned earlier, Myanmar’s politics used to be led by the Bamar. The others had to play within their game. In 1947, it was as if the Bamar directly inherited the state power from the British. It was like they had to hold the Panglong Agreement to confirm that and make it legally valid. When they drafted the 2008 Constitution and held elections in 2010, the state power went to Thein Sein’s government. From there, the NLD took over.
Now, in 2021, when the Bamar military staged a coup, they seized state power. While they are seizing power like that, the ethnic EROs are fighting back and reclaiming their own territories. Now they are preparing and starting to move towards their own self-governance.
So, whether you want to form a union, a federal system, or a confederation, you can do it or not. If you want to do it, you must first discuss common definitions that everyone can agree on. In the meantime, neither the military council nor the NUG can come and manage the land that the EROs have captured and governed, land that the ethnic people have owned for generations. They no longer have state power.
Thirdly – according to the situation described above, the military council will try to establish itself in central Myanmar and try to retake as much of the ethnic areas as possible, and to prevent the territories they hold from being lost. The big Chinese will also back that plan. How realistically close is it for the PDFs to completely defeat and seize the areas currently held by the military council? How much can the NUG do in this matter? And how much will the other foreign countries, like China, blatantly interfere?
Therefore, if we look at the situation in Myanmar realistically, some EROs and the military council will be dividing and ruling their respective territories, and the NUG will be in a position where they can only make announcements. They will be like a minister without a portfolio from the AFPFL era. If the NUG’s principle is to recognize the election results under the 2008 Constitution and that state power must be transferred to the NUG, it will probably not be easy to get along with the EROs. The big Chinese will also try to push the NUG out of the Myanmar political game by saying that they are leaning towards the West.
If they say they are going to form a federal union, who is the organization representing central Myanmar or the Bamar people? If the NUG does not completely step down from the stage of a state power-holding organization called the Union government, which Bamar representative will the other ethnic groups have to negotiate with? In that case, the military council may well enter that table with China’s urging. Or, Myanmar can remain in this limbo for quite some time.
Therefore, if you really want peace in Myanmar, and if you want it to be prosperous and developed, whether it is federal or confederation, it can only be achieved if a truly genuine union is formed in which all ethnic groups have equal political rights. Whether it is any group or any ethnicity, if they really sincerely believe in and accept that they don’t want Myanmar to disintegrate, and if they truly believe in democracy, federalism, and equality, and if they can foresee the future, this is a good opportunity given by the Spring Revolution.
The Bamar ethnic people also need to completely abandon the one-nation-one-state mentality at this time, and the other ethnic people also need to be more magnanimous than just wanting their own territory. In fact, it can be said that other ethnic groups who are not Bamar do not really want to control and rule the whole of Myanmar. But because the Bamar tend to monopolize if they unite, they are less trusting because of past lessons.
Finally, the NUG should realistically accept the situation on the ground. They should completely reject and not accept the 2008 Constitution, officially announce their just and workable processes and stances for the Union, start implementing them, and work with other ethnic groups as a representative of the Bamar ethnic people or as a representative of central Myanmar where the majority of Bamar live.
This will also be a counter-attack against China’s attempt to remove the NUG from the practical political arena. If all the ethnic groups unite and negotiate and continue on the path to a genuine union, the military council will automatically be left behind, and it will be more likely that they can be outmaneuvered politically or militarily.
In that case, the militarism, one-nation-one-state ideology, and racism that are currently flourishing in Myanmar can gradually be extinguished, and a new Myanmar with freedom, equality, and justice can emerge. To make that happen, everyone can fight against the military council, which is a major obstacle. Another major obstacle is the desire of one ethnic group or one group to seize state power and the desire to centralize under a unitary system, which must be abandoned, and they must cultivate a vision and magnanimity to truly build a genuine union.
Oct 19 , 2024
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Is Myanmar Falling Apart?
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